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PLANTINGA’S EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
RELIGION – SOME QUESTIONS
A EpistEmologiA dA REligião dE 
plAntingA – AlgumAs QuEstõEs
Rogel Esteves de Oliveira*
ABSTRACT – This paper raises some questions and objections to Alvin 
Plantinga’s epistemology of religion. In Part I, we have a non-believer 
speaking (an agnostic about God, spirits or the like). She is in fact an 
epistemologist and is not very comfortable with Plantinga’s reformed 
epistemology. In Part II, we have a Christian believer, and the questions 
will therefore be from the perspective of someone who is inside, who 
sincerely believes the main teachings of Christian religion. We do not 
mean by those questions, however, that Plantinga’s approach is wrong. 
It only needs some clarifications.
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RESUMO – Este artigo levanta algumas questões e objeções à episte- 
mologia da religião de Alvin Plantinga. Na Parte I, temos um não-crente 
falando (um agnóstico sobre Deus, espíritos e coisas semelhantes). 
Ele de fato é um epistemólogo e não está muito confortável com a 
epistemologia reformada de Plantinga. Na Parte II, temos um crente 
cristão, e as questões, portanto, serão da perspectiva de alguém que 
está dentro, que sinceramente acredita nos principais ensinamentos 
da religião cristã. Não queremos dar a entender por tais questões, 
entretanto, que a abordagem de Plantinga é errada. Ela somente 
necessita de alguns esclarecimentos.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Plantinga. Epistemologia reformada. Crenças básicas.
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Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of religion is certainly the most 
important example of the so-called “Reformed Epistemology”, which 
unfortunately is not very known in Brazil. Reformed Epistemology is an 
approach to philosophy of religion, in general, and to epistemology of 
religion, in particular, that following Calvin’s Reformed Theology (that’s 
why “Reformed Epistemology”) breaks up with natural theology, that 
is, the traditional thought that epistemology of religion means proofs 
about the existence of God, and that the rationality of the theist or of the 
Christian believer is proportional to her capability of producing those 
proofs. Reformed Epistemology – especially Plantinga’s – is refreshing 
because it shows us that there are other ways of thinking about the 
rationality of religious beliefs – ways that, in my opinion, are closer to 
the experience of most religious people. More specifically, according to 
Plantinga (1983, 2000) we can think about some religious beliefs as basic 
or properly basic (in Plantinga’s terminology). These religious beliefs are 
formed and held without arguments or any kind of inference, in a direct 
way, and can be justified and warranted in being so formed and held. 
For just that, Plantinga’s work on the subject must be more known and 
appreciated.
Of course, we can raise objections to this approach, though. And 
that’s the focus of this paper. I don’t purport to have new objections, 
however, and much less knockdown objections to Plantinga‘s Reformed 
Epistemology. What I do have are questions – and only questions! – that 
“naturally” arise when we get acquainted with Plantinga’s approach. 
These questions (and the future answers, of course) will certainly be the 
occasion to clarify his thought for all of us. So I hope.
We can divide our questions into two parts. For the first part, we will 
have a non-believer speaking (an agnostic about God, spirits or the like). 
She is in fact an epistemologist. And I think I should say that she is not 
very comfortable with Plantinga’s approach, seeming to be a little rude 
sometimes. For the second part, we’ll have a believer, a Christian believer, 
and the questions will therefore be from the perspective of someone 
who is inside, who sincerely believes the main teachings of Christian 
religion.
I
So goes the non-believer. She will talk directly to Professor Plantinga:
“Professor Plantinga: I’m very suspicious of your philosophical work 
on religion, and I’ll say why. First of all, you have brought the notion 
of design plan into your account of warranted belief (Plantinga, 1993),   R. E. de Oliveira – Plantinga’s epistemology of religion
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and we all know why. It fits very well, in fact, too well, in your ‘design 
plan’ of introducing God on the epistemological stage. And no wonder 
you can construct models, like your Aquinas/Calvin model (Plantinga, 
2000), where all the main Christian beliefs are warranted because, among 
other things, they are formed according to a design plan – God‘s plan! 
Why not just keep something like Goldman’s (1979) reliability condition 
of warrant plus something about the right environment? It seems 
that you kindly give us something just to take something back a little   
later!
“But that’s not the worst part. When we get to your ‘Internal 
Instigation of the Holy Spirit’ (Plantinga, 2000, Chapter 8), a purported 
cognitive faculty or process that delivers (properly) basic beliefs to the 
Christian believer, we have to stop. What’s that? We have a problem 
here. In fact, it’s very problematic, to say the least, to bring to the 
epistemological scene a purported cognitive faculty or power or process 
whose existence is not recognized by most epistemologists (not to say 
most people!) and whose deliverances cannot be evaluated, especially 
with respect to its reliability!
“I know you’ll reply there is no problem here. Maybe you’ll point 
out that we usually discuss about and evaluate purported cognitive 
faculties or powers whose existence are controversial and even not 
recognized by most people; for example, clairvoyance. It’s true. But in 
these cases, we can and do evaluate them examining the reliability of 
their purported deliverances. So, in the case of clairvoyance, supposedly 
most epistemologists don’t recognize it as a real cognitive faculty 
or power; nonetheless, they can evaluate it by checking whether its 
alleged deliverances are reliable or not. But that is not the case with your 
“Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit”. How can we check its reliability? 
If a Christian believer, instigated by the Holy Spirit, believes, in a basic 
way, that Jesus is God and that Jesus loves her, how can we check the 
reliability of this ‘cognitive‘ process?
“But now you can rejoin, I know, saying that there are other cognitive 
faculties whose reliability we cannot check, at least not without epistemic 
circularity (see Alston, 1993; Cohen, 2002). The best example (from Alston) 
is perception in general. True. But note that now we have the opposite 
case. We cannot check its reliability (without circularity), but we do 
recognize, all of us, the existence of this cognitive faculty that, even if 
unreliable, delivers perceptual beliefs all the time in all of us (if, of course, 
there are other people besides me!).
“So, to sum up: it seems legitimate to bring to the epistemological 
discussion a purported cognitive faculty or process when its existence 
is generally recognized or, at least, when its alleged deliverances can R. E. de Oliveira – Plantinga’s epistemology of religion
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be checked with respect to its reliability. Unfortunately, your internal 
instigation of the Holy Spirit doesn’t meet either of those plausible 
conditions.
“Finally, I have a third question or objection for you. It has to do with 
the de facto question about Christian belief. I know that in your major 
work on epistemology of religion, Warranted Christian Belief (Plantinga, 
2000), about which we are discussing, you emphatically say that you 
aren’t defending the truth of the Christian belief, nor even its warrant. 
You clearly say that, what you are defending is that if Christian belief is 
true, then it is probably warranted (in a way pretty much like your A/C 
model). In other words, the de jure question is not independent of the de 
facto question (ibid., Chapter 6).
“OK. So if I want to know whether Christian belief is warranted, I 
have to know whether it is true. OK, again. Now I want to know whether 
Christian belief (understood as the main teachings of Christianity) is 
true. I need your help. What am I supposed to do? Your A/C model 
says that Christian belief is formed in a basic way, that is, without the 
need of arguments, without the need of any propositional evidence. So, 
presumably, you won’t show me any arguments for the existence of God 
or the like. Following your (extended) model (ibid., Chapter 8), you will 
probably show me or tell me some important verse from Scriptures. And 
we, you and me, will have to wait for the internal instigation of the Holy 
Spirit working on me, producing the relevant beliefs. But what if I don’t 
see, in a basic way, what you see (or what you say you see), as it has 
actually happened with me and many others? What can I do? I look and 
look at the Bible and don’t see what is supposedly obvious for you! But I 
really want to know about the truth or not of Christian belief! What can 
I do now?
“The situation is a little embarrassing, and you have only two options. 
You can get tired and eventually stop trying to help me see (in a basic 
way) the truth of Christian belief – what may be embarrassing again 
for you – or you can try to convince me through one or more arguments, 
contrary to the suggestion of your A/C model! That seems embarrassing 
for you again! After all, why all this model, and the whole Reformed 
Epistemology, if we can and have to come back to the old natural 
theology?
“So, it seems that, if I want to know about the truth of the Christian 
belief (and therefore of its warrant or not), we will have a great probability 
of getting to embarrassing situations – for me, for you, or for both of us. 
There must be something wrong with your Reformed Epistemology!
“Definitively if some day I come to be a Christian, I’ll have to be a 
Catholic!”.R. E. de Oliveira – Plantinga’s epistemology of religion
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II
Now comes the Christian believer. She has only one important 
question, but a crucial one, and will address Professor Plantinga in the 
third person.
“I’m a Christian, believing in God and in all main teachings of 
Christianity. In fact, I think I can’t help believing them, as if a strong power 
forced me to see them as true. Interesting enough, I’ve been told about 
Professor Plantinga’s work, especially about his Reformed Epistemology. 
I agree with him. I haven’t come to believe in God and His teachings 
based on proofs and arguments of any sort. It just happened that from 
one point in time on I started to see some Christian propositions as true, 
and clearly true. Plantinga says ‘in a properly basic way’. Yes, exactly!
“Sometimes, however, I wonder whether I’m not getting fanatical or 
even crazy about religious matters. I can’t help believing those religious 
teachings, as I told, but I still can wonder, at least sometimes, whether 
I’m not being misled by my (let me say) religious intuitions and insights. 
I know very well, from my past experiences, that sometimes what had 
used to seem obvious for me turned out to be wrong or false later. Could 
it be that what seems obvious for me now about religious matters will 
turn out to be false in the future? Oh, I must be in a religious crisis!
“Well, Professor Plantinga says (following Aquinas and Calvin) that, 
what I call ‘religious intuitions or insights’ are or, more exactly, can be 
the internal instigations of the Holy Spirit (2000). He also says that, if 
this A/C model is true, then my Christian beliefs are also true; and, most 
importantly, if Christian belief is true (as well as the A/C model), then 
my basic beliefs are externally rational and warranted: I’m not fanatical, 
crazy or misled by my religious faculties!
“But the problem is that I don’t want a conditional: ‘If this A/C model 
is true…’. Or, ‘If Christian belief is true…’. I have so far believed Christian 
teaching is true. I have so far seen it as true. But now I question: are my 
‘spiritual eyes’ reliable?  Are my religious beliefs not only true (they could 
be true by accident), but also warranted? (To use Professor Plantinga’s 
terminology). It doesn’t work for me to say that if Christian belief is 
true, then my spiritual eyes (or whatever) are reliable and my beliefs are 
warranted.  That doesn’t help me at all!
“I could summarize my present situation saying that I am a Christian. 
I do believe the Christian teachings are true. But at the same time I ask 
or should ask: Why do I believe them? Because the Holy Spirit tells me in 
a basic way that they are true? But the Holy Spirit himself is part of my 
Christian beliefs, whose epistemic status I’m now questioning!R. E. de Oliveira – Plantinga’s epistemology of religion
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“Oh, don’t tell me that I can’t have both this questioning and my 
Christian beliefs, as though they were incompatible! I don’t become a non-
Christian because of theses questions, do I?  I think a famous Christian 
has said that Faith searches for understanding...”.
III
We do not mean by all the questions in Part I and II that Plantinga’s 
epistemology of religion is wrong and therefore that we should go back 
to the old natural theology, as some authors have argued (see Zagzebski, 
1993). In fact, as we have said before, Plantinga’s epistemology of religion 
seems to give us an account that is closer to what actually happens 
with the believer, especially with her religious experience. On the other 
hand, natural theology seems to be so far from the believer’s reality! 
Nevertheless, there are important questions that must be clarified by 
Plantinga and the Reformed epistemologists. Certainly everyone will 
gain from their answers.
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